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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Problematic as a lemon of a vehicle may be, the 
problem becomes more complex when it is peeling.  This 
appeal involves a putative consumer class action seeking 
damages resulting from the delamination, i.e., peeling and 
flaking, of the lining of certain Ford truck fuel tanks between 
2001 and 2010—a problem that plagued numerous Ford F-
Series and E-Series vehicles in multiple countries and that, 
according to Appellant Galo Coba, Ford knew stemmed from 
a defect.  It requires us to resolve two open questions for our 
Court:  first, whether a district court’s denial of class 
certification divests the court of jurisdiction in a case where 
its jurisdiction was predicated solely on the Class Action 
Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d); and second, whether a 
warranty that covers only defects in “materials or 
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workmanship” extends to design defects under New Jersey 
common law.  We must also evaluate whether a reasonable 
jury could conclude on this record that Ford knew the alleged 
fuel-tank defect was the cause of the delamination problem at 
the relevant time. 
Because we conclude that the District Court properly 
exercised its jurisdiction, that the materials-or-workmanship 
warranty did not cover design defects, and that the record 
evidence of Ford’s knowledge about the defect does not 
create a triable issue, we will affirm the District Court’s entry 
of summary judgment in favor of Ford on all of Coba’s 
claims. 
I. Background 
A. Ford’s Fuel Tank Troubles 
Beginning in 2001 and continuing over the decade that 
followed, Ford received waves of complaints from customers 
who purchased certain F-Series and E-Series vehicles 
reporting similar types of malfunction related to their 
vehicles’ fuel tanks.  The fuel tanks used in certain vehicle 
models were susceptible to a problem known as 
“delamination,” whereby particles of the tank lining would 
separate from the underlying metal and mix with the vehicle’s 
fuel.  As the fuel carrying those particles makes its way 
through the vehicle’s fuel system, the particles can clog the 
fuel filter, which constrains fuel flow to the engine and 
reduces power.  The particles can also damage fuel-system 
components, such as injectors.  If left untreated, the problem 
eventually may lead to difficulties starting the engine or 
keeping the vehicle running.   
In 2001, when Ford first received reports that some of 
its vehicles were exhibiting fuel-tank delamination problems, 
the complaints came exclusively from customers in Brazil.  
Over the next few years, cases of delamination cropped up in 
the United States, though they were largely clustered in 
certain regions.  For example, as of January 2004, forty-three 
of the eighty-six warranty claims submitted to Ford that 
related to delamination had come from customers in Ohio.  
Because of the geographically concentrated occurrence of the 
delamination complaints, both Ford and the supplier of its 
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fuel-tank coatings, Magni Industries, Inc., suspected that 
unique qualities in regional fuel supplies were to blame for 
delamination.  In particular, as Ford investigated, its 
suspicions gravitated toward fuel containing excessive 
concentrations of biodiesel, which Ford recommended against 
using because its tanks were not authorized to withstand 
biodiesel concentrations over 5%.  That theory was consistent 
with Ford’s data in some respects because Brazil, where the 
problem started, did not have established biodiesel 
regulations until 2005.   
Although Ford could not confirm that biodiesel was 
the culprit—and Ford’s engineers sometimes questioned the 
biodiesel hypothesis in light of inconclusive testing—Ford’s 
leads were compelling enough that it started working with 
Magni in 2005 to develop a more biodiesel-resistant coating.  
And by February 2007, Ford released an improved coating, 
called “A35,” to replace the prior “A36” coating in F-Series 
Super Duty trucks.  Around the same time, Ford sent a 
message to dealers notifying them about the release of the 
new tank coating and explaining that fuel tanks in certain 
Ford trucks had delaminated, which Ford attributed to “the 
use of fuels containing concentrations of bio-diesel greater 
than recommended by Ford (5%).”  App. 86.   
Ford’s warranty claims did drop after the release of the 
A35 coating, but some reports of delamination persisted.  
Having not fully solved the problem, Ford continued its 
investigation.  And by 2010, Ford’s Materials Engineering 
department came to believe that biodiesel was not the root 
cause after all; instead, acetic and formic acids—which Ford 
discovered in fuel samples from service station pumps near a 
dealer that encountered numerous delamination complaints—
were more likely the cause all along.   
B. Coba’s Lawsuit 
Galo Coba, the plaintiff in this case, is one of the Ford-
vehicle customers whose fuel tanks delaminated.  He 
purchased two Ford 2006 F-350 Super Duty 6.0L diesel dump 
trucks for his landscaping business, Coba Landscaping and 
Construction, Inc.  He bought the first in October of 2006 and 
the second in March of 2007.  By March of 2009, both trucks 
began exhibiting signs of tank delamination.  According to 
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Coba, the engines would misfire, the trucks lacked power 
when driven up hills, the fuel filters were contaminated with 
fuel-tank debris, and the fuel systems rusted.   
He brought the trucks into a Ford dealership, which 
replaced the fuel tanks and fuel filters in both trucks at no 
cost to Coba.  Despite the repairs, Coba had the same 
problems over and over again, needing additional 
replacements each time.  Altogether, Coba replaced the fuel 
tank twice in his older truck and three times in his newer 
truck.  Because several of the replacements occurred after the 
trucks’ warranties had expired, Coba spent several thousand 
dollars on the fixes.   
Coba filed this class-action lawsuit against Ford Motor 
Company in March of 2012.  As amended, the operative 
complaint asserts claims for breach of express warranty, 
violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA), 
and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.1  
Although Ford had replaced several of Coba’s fuel tanks 
under warranty, Coba alleges that Ford breached its written 
warranty—the New Vehicle Limited Warranty (NVLW)—by 
failing to adequately repair and replace his tanks, as the 
replacements turned out to have the same defects as his 
original tanks.  The thrust of the implied-covenant-of-good-
faith-and-fair-dealing claim is that when Ford repaired Coba’s 
vehicles, it knew that the repairs would not solve Coba’s 
delamination problems.  Finally, Coba’s NJCFA claim rests 
on allegations that Ford purposefully failed to disclose to 
Coba and other customers the defect in its fuel tanks.   
The District Court entered summary judgment in 
Ford’s favor on all of Coba’s claims.  See Coba v. Ford 
Motor Co., No. 12-1622, 2016 WL 5746361, at *13–14 
(D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2016); Coba v. Ford Motor Co., No. 12-
1622, 2017 WL 3332264, at *11 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2017).  This 
appeal followed.  
                                              
1 It also asserts a common law fraud claim, which 
Coba is no longer pursuing.   
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II. Discussion  
A. Jurisdiction 
We address a threshold issue of jurisdiction before 
turning to the merits of the District Court’s decision.  While 
our jurisdiction to hear Coba’s appeal is clear under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291, the propriety of the District Court’s jurisdiction is less 
straightforward and an issue we must address at the outset.   
The District Court initially exercised jurisdiction over 
Coba’s suit—a class action asserting state-law claims—
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which 
gives district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action 
in which the matter in controversy exceeds . . . $5,000,000 . . . 
and is a class action in which . . . any member of a class of 
plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant.”  
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (emphasis added).  But when the District 
Court entered summary judgment on three of Coba’s four 
claims in September of 2016, it simultaneously denied Coba’s 
motion for class certification as moot even though it had not 
yet disposed of the NJCFA claim.  Because § 1332(d) 
provides original jurisdiction only over “class action[s],” that 
ruling raises the question whether the District Court still had 
jurisdiction when it entered its final summary judgment order 
in August of 2017.  Thus, before we address the merits of this 
appeal, we must consider an issue of first impression for our 
Court:  If a federal court properly exercises jurisdiction 
pursuant to § 1332(d) at the time a claim is filed or removed, 
does a subsequent denial of class certification divest the court 
of subject-matter jurisdiction?   
In accordance with every other Circuit Court to 
address this question, we conclude that it does not.2  We start 
                                              
2 See F5 Capital v. Pappas, 856 F.3d 61, 75–77 (2d 
Cir. 2017); Louisiana v. Am. Nat. Prop. Cas. Co., 746 F.3d 
633, 639–40 (5th Cir. 2014); Metz v. Unizan Bank, 649 F.3d 
492, 500–01 (6th Cir. 2011); Buetow v. A.L.S. Enters., Inc., 
650 F.3d 1178, 1182 n.2 (8th Cir. 2011); United Steel, Paper 
& Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. 
Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Shell Oil Co., 602 
F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2010); Cunningham Charter Corp. 
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with the text:  District courts have “original jurisdiction” over 
“class action[s],” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), which the statute 
defines as “civil action[s] filed under [R]ule 23 . . . or [a] 
similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing 
an action to be brought . . . as a class action,” id. § 
1332(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).  This conferral of 
jurisdiction plainly encompasses a suit like Coba’s, which 
was “filed under [R]ule 23,” notwithstanding its eventual 
failure to become certified under Rule 23.  See Metz v. Unizan 
Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2011) (“The ‘filed under’ 
language shows that it is the time of filing that matters for 
determining jurisdiction under CAFA.”); Cunningham 
Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 806 (7th Cir. 
2010) (noting that § 1332(d)(1)(B) “defines class action as a 
suit filed under a statute or rule authorizing class actions, 
even though many such suits cannot be maintained as class 
actions because the judge refuses to certify a class”).  Indeed, 
“[h]ad Congress intended that a properly removed class 
action be remanded if a class is not eventually certified, it 
could have said so.”  United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, 
Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union, 
AFL-CIO, CLC v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th 
Cir. 2010). 
True, § 1332(d)(8) states that CAFA “shall apply to 
any class action before or after the entry of a class 
certification order by the court with respect to that action,” 
but, as the Seventh Circuit has aptly noted, that subsection 
refers to “a” certification order, not “the” certification order, 
and the former connotes an indefinite expectation that a 
certification order may issue.  Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 806 
(explaining that subsection (d)(8) at most suggests that a class 
“may be certified eventually” (emphasis added)).  Moreover, 
unlike subsection (d)(2), subsection (d)(8) omits reference to 
“jurisdiction,” indicating it pertains not to the scope of 
jurisdiction conferred by the statute, but to the timing of 
certification in relation to removal.  See id. 
                                                                                                     
v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 806–07 (7th Cir. 2010); Vega v. 




Beyond CAFA’s text, general jurisdictional principles 
also support our conclusion that the denial of class 
certification did not divest the District Court of jurisdiction 
over the NJCFA claim.  Typically, “[j]urisdictional facts are 
determined at the time of removal [or filing], not by 
subsequent events.”  Louisiana v. Am. Nat’l Prop. Cas. Co., 
746 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 2014); accord Cunningham, 592 
F.3d at 807; Metz, 649 F.3d at 500–01; United Steel, 602 F.3d 
at 1091–92.  Of course, that principle is not absolute.  See 
Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 807 (discussing exceptions, such as 
mootness doctrine); United Steel, 602 F.3d at 1092 n.3 
(same).  However, as Congress did not make any exception 
here, it seems “likely that Congress intended that the usual 
and long-standing principles apply—post-filing developments 
do not defeat jurisdiction if jurisdiction was properly invoked 
as of the time of filing.”  Id. at 1091–92. 
Assured of the District Court’s jurisdiction, we turn to 
the merits of the District Court’s summary judgment ruling.   
B. The District Court’s Grant of Summary 
Judgment 
On appeal, Coba challenges the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment on his claims for breach of express 
warranty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, and violation of the NJCFA.  We review those 
rulings de novo.  See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 
F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).  Viewing the evidence “in the 
light most favorable” to Coba as the non-moving party, 
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 768 (2014), we consider 
whether Ford has shown “that there is no genuine dispute as 
to any material fact and [that it] is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We address each claim 
in turn. 
1. Breach of Express Warranty  
The District Court entered summary judgment on 
Coba’s breach-of-express-warranty claim because it 
determined that the fuel-tank defect at issue was outside the 
scope of Ford’s written warranty, the NVLW.  The District 
Court reasoned (1) that the NVLW—which provides that 
Ford will “repair, replace, or adjust all parts on [his] vehicle 
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that are defective in factory-supplied materials or 
workmanship,” App. 248—covers only “materials or 
workmanship” defects, not design defects, and (2) that the 
fuel-tank defect alleged by Coba fell in the design-defect 
category.  We agree on both points.3  
a. A Warranty for Defects in “Materials or 
Workmanship” Does Not Encompass 
“Design” Defects 
New Jersey law, which governs our interpretation of 
the NVLW, see Collins v. Mary Kay, Inc., 874 F.3d 176, 
181–82 (3d Cir. 2017), does not specifically address whether 
a warranty for “materials or workmanship” covers “design” 
defects.  In the absence of any guidance from New Jersey 
courts on this particular issue, we “must predict how [New 
Jersey’s] highest court would decide [it]” based upon 
“relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, considered 
dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending 
convincingly to show how the highest court in the state would 
                                              
3 Coba contends that we cannot affirm on these 
grounds because Ford did not argue that design defects were 
excluded from the NVLW’s coverage, and the District Court 
did not provide notice to Coba that it was considering these 
grounds sua sponte.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(2) (“After 
giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the court may 
. . . grant the motion [for summary judgment] on grounds not 
raised by a party . . . .”); see also Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 
483, 500 (3d Cir. 2006).  But here, Ford did request summary 
judgment on these grounds.  See Ford Motor Company’s 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 36 n.4, ECF No. 130-1 at 70 (Sept. 18, 2015).  While Ford 
did not flesh out the argument in detail in its summary 
judgment briefing, it did make reference to the District 
Court’s extensive discussion of that very issue, which was 
sufficient to raise the argument.  See In re Ins. Brokerage 
Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 262 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(recognizing that the relevant question as to waiver is whether 
a party “presented the argument with sufficient specificity to 
alert the district court”). 
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decide the issue at hand.”  Berrier v. Simplicity Mfg., Inc., 
563 F.3d 38, 46 (3d Cir. 2009). 
We start with general principles of contract 
interpretation under New Jersey law and give the terms of the 
NVLW their “plain and ordinary meaning.”  M.J. Paquet, Inc. 
v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 794 A.2d 141, 152 (N.J. 2002).  If 
those terms are unambiguous, resolution by summary 
judgment is appropriate.  See Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 
140 A.2d 199, 204 (N.J. 1958) (holding that “the construction 
of a written agreement is a matter for the court,” not a jury, 
unless “its meaning is uncertain or ambiguous”). 
The plain and ordinary meaning of the term “defect[s] 
in . . . materials or workmanship,” App. 248, unambiguously 
excludes “design” defects.  As an initial matter, the plain 
definitions of “workmanship” and “materials” are 
conceptually distinct from the definition of “design.”  
“Workmanship” is the “the execution or manner of making or 
doing something,” Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 2635 (1993),4 and “materials” are the “the basic 
matter (as metal, wood, plastic, fiber) from which the whole 
or the greater part of something physical (as a machine, tool, 
building, fabric) is made,” id. at 1392.  Both definitions relate 
to the execution phase of making an object and connote the 
physical realization of something.  By contrast, the definition 
of “design”—“a preliminary sketch or outline (as a drawing 
on paper or a modeling in clay) showing the main features of 
something to be executed,” id. at 611—relates to the 
preparation stage that guides, and precedes, execution.5  Thus, 
                                              
4 The New Jersey Supreme Court regularly relies on 
this dictionary and other versions of it when determining the 
plain and ordinary meaning of terms.  See, e.g., State v. Tate, 
106 A.3d 1195, 1204 (N.J. 2015); Highland Lakes Country 
Club & Cmty. Ass’n v. Franzino, 892 A.2d 646, 657 (N.J. 
2006); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 481 A.2d 271, 275 (N.J. 1984), 
rev’d on other grounds, 475 U.S. 355 (1986). 
5 While “workmanship,” “materials,” and “design” 
each have multiple alternative definitions, we only highlight 
the definitions that are most relevant to the context of the 
issue before us, i.e., product development.  But these words’ 
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in the context of product development, defects in 
“workmanship” and “materials” are flaws pertaining to the 
construction or manufacture of a product, while defects in 
“design” are shortcomings that arise in the plans for a 
product’s creation.  More specifically, a “materials” defect is 
a failing in the quality of the actual substances used to make a 
product, see Hammel v. Van Sickle, 128 A. 247, 248 (N.J. 
1925) (per curiam); a “workmanship” defect is a deficiency in 
the execution of a product’s assembly or construction, see 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 79 (N.J. 
1960); and a “design” defect is a flaw inherent in the 
product’s intended operation and construction, see O’Brien v. 
Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 304 (N.J. 1983).6 
Historical practice in products liability litigation, 
dating back more than a century, reflects a consistent 
understanding of the distinctions among these categories.  
See, e.g., Lombard Corp. v. Quality Aluminum Prod. Co., 261 
F.2d 336, 338 (6th Cir. 1958) (“A defect in material is a 
defect in quality. . . .  A defect in workmanship is a defect in 
the way some part of the machine is constructed. . . .  Design, 
on the contrary, involves the overall plan of construction and 
operation.”); Moss v. Smith, 185 P. 385, 385 (Cal. 1919) (“It 
is conceded that the engine and clutch of the automobile in 
question were defective, but the appellants claim that the 
                                                                                                     
other definitions would not alter our reasoning; if anything, 
they strengthen the meaning we ascribe to them.  See, e.g., 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2635 (1993) 
(defining “workmanship” as “the quality imparted to a thing 
in the process of making”); id. at 1392 (defining “materials” 
as “the finished stuff of which something physical (as an 
article of clothing) is made”); id. at 611 (defining “design” as 
“a mental project or scheme in which means to an end are laid 
down”). 
6 Although not relevant to the issues we address today, 
we note that O’Brien was superseded by N.J.S.A. 2A:58C–
3a(2) to the extent it concerns the “consumer expectations” 
doctrine.  Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 
1239, 1252 (N.J. 1990). 
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defects were those of design instead of material or 
workmanship.”).7   
In light of this common law, it is unsurprising that 
courts have regularly rejected arguments like Coba’s that a 
design defect is within the scope of a materials-and-
workmanship warranty clause.  See, e.g., Bruce Martin 
Constr., Inc. v. CTB, Inc., 735 F.3d 750, 753–54 (8th Cir. 
                                              
7 See also S. Gas & Gasoline Engine Co. v. Adams & 
Peters, 198 S.W. 676, 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917), rev’d on 
other grounds, 227 S.W. 945 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1921) (“A 
careful examination of the voluminous testimony of the 
witness . . . discloses that there was much of it that went to 
other matters than mere defects in the design or plan of the 
engine and its various parts, that is, to defects in 
workmanship and material . . . .”); Dalton Adding Mach. 
Sales Co. v. Denton, 234 P. 201, 203 (Okla. 1925) (debating 
whether a warranty covers only “defective materials and 
workmanship” or also covers defects of “design”); Murdock 
v. A. A. Sutain, Ltd., 147 N.Y.S.2d 429, 431 (Sup. Ct. 1955) 
(“[T]he materials and workmanship were inferior.  The 
design, however, was the same . . . .”); Simmons v. Gibbs 
Mfg. Co., 170 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Ohio 1959) (“[T]he 
criticism of the expert related only to the design of the top, 
and not to the materials and workmanship.”); Shelby Mut. Ins. 
Co. of Shelby, Ohio v. Ferber Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 156 
So. 2d 748, 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (“[I]n his opinion 
the roof developed the leak because of faulty design of the 
flashing rather than due to the materials and workmanship 
furnished by appellee, and . . . the architect on the job was 
responsible for the design . . . .”); Totten v. Gruzen, 245 A.2d 
1, 5 (N.J. 1968) (“[L]iability may rest on architects and 
engineers on the basis of improper design as well as on 
contractors for defective materials, equipment and 
workmanship.”); Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 300 
A.2d 231, 234 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972) (“The [issue] is whether 
the language used in the guarantee clause limits damages so 
as to preclude damages for design defects (as opposed to 




2013); Voelker v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 353 F.3d 516, 
526–27 (7th Cir. 2003); Davidson v. Apple, Inc., No. 16-CV-
04942-LHK, 2017 WL 976048, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
14, 2017); Rollolazo v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. CV 16-
00966, 2017 WL 6888501, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2017); 
Robinson v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., No. 13-006, 2015 WL 
5334739, at *12 (D.N.J. Sept. 11, 2015); Nelson v. Nissan N. 
Am., Inc., No. CIV. 11-5712, 2014 WL 7331075, at *2–3 
(D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2014); Orthoflex, Inc. v. ThermoTek, Inc., 
No. 3:11–CV–0870–D, 3:10–CV–2618–D, 2013 WL 
4045206, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2013); Rice v. Sunbeam 
Prods., Inc., No. CV 12-7923, 2013 WL 146270, at *12 (C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 7, 2013); Horvath v. LG Elecs. Mobilecomm U.S.A., 
Inc., No. 3:11-CV-01576-H-RBB, 2012 WL 2861160, at *5 
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2012).   
The two contrary district court decisions on which 
Coba relies do not persuade us otherwise.  Koulajian v. Trek 
Bicycle Corp. provides almost no analysis to support its bare 
conclusion that a “warranty’s reference to ‘workmanship’ 
could refer to . . . designs as well as to implementation of 
those designs,” and thus, it offers nothing helpful for us to 
consider.  No. 90-Civ-3156, 1992 WL 28884, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 11, 1992).  And the logic of In re Saturn L-Series Timing 
Chain Products Liability Litigation is that “design is 
integrated into each step of the manufacturing process and 
affects both materials and workmanship.”  MDL No. 1920, 
2008 WL 4866604, at *15 (D. Neb. Nov. 7, 2008).  That is 
true, but it misses the point:  While a design might dictate 
what material or workmanship is required, it does not speak 
to their quality. 
In short, we conclude that, under New Jersey law, a 
warranty that limits its coverage to defects in “materials” and 
“workmanship” does not, without more, apply to defects in 
“design.”  While parties are free to redefine words in their 
contracts in ways that deviate from plain and ordinary 
meaning, they did not do so here.  “Materials” and 
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“workmanship” in the NVLW carry their plain meaning, and 
the warranty therefore does not extend to design defects.8   
b. The Fuel Tank Defect Was a Design 
Defect  
Having concluded that the NVLW does not cover 
design defects, we must determine whether the fuel-tank-
delamination problem, as alleged, reflected a defect in design.  
We agree with the District Court that it does, so the court 
properly entered summary judgment on Coba’s breach-of-
warranty claim. 
Accounting for the differences between design, 
materials, and workmanship defects, see supra Section 
II.B.1.a, the alleged flaw in Ford’s fuel tanks has all the 
trappings of a design defect.  The fundamental nature of the 
defect relates to the “overall plan of construction and 
operation” of the fuel tanks.  Lombard Corp., 261 F.2d at 
338.  The problem, as consistently described by Coba, was 
                                              
8 Coba asserts that Ford’s repeated replacements of 
Coba’s fuel tanks constitute a course of performance that 
should be given “controlling weight” in interpreting these 
terms.  Appellant’s Reply Br. 5.  It is true that, for contracts 
governed by New Jersey’s Uniform Commercial Code, which 
Ford concedes is applicable, course of performance may be 
used to “explain[]” or “supplement[]” a written agreement’s 
terms.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-202; see also id. § 12A:2-
208.  But, under the UCC, a meaning suggested by a course 
of performance is trumped by the express terms of an 
agreement.  See id. § 12A:2-208(2) (“The express terms of 
the agreement and any such course of performance . . . shall 
be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each 
other; but when such construction is unreasonable, express 
terms shall control course of performance . . . .”).  In any 
event, Ford’s course of performance is not inconsistent with 
our interpretation of the NVLW:  Its willingness to repair and 
replace some of Coba’s malfunctioning fuel tanks without 
quibbling over whether and how the parts were defective 
appears motivated by a desire to retain customer goodwill 
rather than by an obligation to replace parts afflicted with 
design defects.   
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not a low-quality supply of the A35 and A36 coatings or a 
problem in the process for applying them to Ford’s fuel tanks; 
rather, it was Ford’s plan to use those coatings at all in 
constructing its fuel tanks.9  And that flawed-design theory is 
consistent with the evidence on which Coba relies, including 
Ford’s own conclusion in 2010 that tanks were delaminating 
because “the A36 and A35 fuel tank coatings cannot tolerate 
a constant supply of acetic and formic acids in fuel.”  App. 
1203.  It is also consistent with Coba’s allegations that “[a]ll” 
of the vehicles manufactured this way suffer from a 
“common” issue, App. 83, and that the “root cause” of 
delamination was that “all of the tanks at issue, as designed, 
were susceptible to delamination” when exposed to certain 
acids, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Class 
Certification at 2, ECF No. 132 (Sept. 18, 2015) (emphasis 
added).  See Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am. Corp., 554 So.2d 927, 
941 n.5 (Ala. 1989) (noting that a design defect exists when 
“every product of a line is defective” (emphasis omitted)); cf. 
also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 2 (1998) 
(distinguishing design defects from “manufacturing defects,” 
which occur where a “product departs from its intended 
design”).   
As Coba alleged a design defect, and the NVLW 
covered only materials and workmanship defects, the District 
Court properly granted summary judgment on Coba’s breach-
of-warranty claim. 
2. Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing 
Because Coba did not have any right to repair or 
replacement of his fuel tanks under the NVLW, he also could 
not prevail on his claim for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.  New Jersey recognizes an 
                                              
9 Although the allegations in Coba’s complaint 
suggested that the fuel tanks might suffer from a 
“manufacturing defect,” App. 83, the summary judgment 
record is devoid of any evidence supporting the existence of 
such a defect.  And in neither his summary judgment briefing 
nor his briefing on appeal has Coba argued that the fuel tanks’ 
manufacturing process was defective.   
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implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every 
contract, Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 
1126 (N.J. 2001), but to state a claim that it was breached, a 
plaintiff must have “the right . . . to receive the fruits of the 
contract” and must show that the defendant had “improper 
motive” when interfering with that right, Wade v. Kessler 
Inst., 798 A.2d 1251, 1259–60 (N.J. 2002) (citation omitted).   
Here, Coba alleges that Ford breached the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing implied in the NVLW by repairing 
and replacing his tanks, while “knowing that those repairs and 
replacements would not fix or remedy the [f]uel [t]ank 
[d]efect.”  App. 129.  But even assuming Ford possessed an 
improper motive—a questionable notion given the evolving 
nature of Ford’s knowledge of a design defect—the NVLW 
did not cover design defects, so tank repair and replacement 
were not “fruits of the [NVLW]” that Coba had a “right . . . to 
receive.”  Wade, 798 A.2d at 1259.   
3. New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act 
To prove a violation of the New Jersey Consumer 
Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:8–1 to –210, a plaintiff must 
establish “that the defendant engaged in an unlawful practice 
that caused an ascertainable loss to the plaintiff,” Frederico v. 
Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 202 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Cox v. 
Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 462–65 (N.J. 1994)).  
There are three general types of “unlawful practices”: 
“affirmative acts, knowing omissions, and regulation 
violations.”  Id. (quoting Cox, 647 A.2d at 462).  A plaintiff 
asserting a claim based on an omission must demonstrate that 
the defendant “(1) knowingly concealed (2) a material fact (3) 
with the intention that plaintiff rely upon the concealment.”  
Judge v. Blackfin Yacht Corp., 815 A.2d 537, 541 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2.   
Here, Coba’s NJCFA claim rests on two theories, both 
predicated on omissions by Ford: (1) that Ford knew and did 
not disclose that the fuel tank suffered from a design defect 
that caused delamination, and (2) that even if Ford did not 
know the cause of the delamination, it failed to disclose the 
risk.  The District Court held, as to the first, that Coba failed 
to put forth sufficient evidence of Ford’s knowledge of the 
design defect, and, as to the second, that “the information 
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about the risk of delamination that Ford had available to it at 
the time [Coba purchased his trucks] was not material.”  
Coba, 2017 WL 3332264, at *4–9.  For the reasons explained 
below, we agree with both conclusions. 
a. Ford’s Knowledge of the Design Defect 
To prevail on the theory that Ford failed to disclose a 
known design defect, Coba would need to show that Ford had 
that knowledge at the time of his purchases—i.e., before 
March 9, 2007, when Coba purchased his second truck.  
Viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable” to 
Coba, Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 768, no reasonable jury could 
find Ford had that knowledge.  Internal email correspondence 
shows that, as early as 2005, Ford knew that the problem had 
existed for several years and was investigating its cause.  But 
the evidence does not show that Ford knew that the cause was 
the design of its tanks.  To the contrary, it shows that 
throughout the relevant period, Ford suspected the problem 
was the improper use by certain customers of fuel with high 
biodiesel concentrations, which seemed plausible in light of 
the geographic clustering of delamination occurrence and the 
phenomenon’s origin in Brazil.  In September 2006, which 
was one month before Coba purchased his first Ford vehicle, 
a meeting of Ford managers and engineers concluded that 
“[t]he cause for damaged fuel tanks is biodiesel (both refined 
and the home brewed type) with bio concentrations greater 
than 20% (Ford only authorizes concentrations up to 5%).”  
App. 1145.  And biodiesel fuel remained the prime suspect in 
February 2007, just before Coba bought his second truck, as 
apparent in both the message Ford then sent to dealers 
explaining that fuel containing biodiesel at high 
concentrations might cause delamination, and its development 
of the more biodiesel-resistant A35 coating that it released 
that month.  As the District Court concluded, there was no 
genuine dispute that at the time Coba bought his trucks, Ford 
“believ[ed] that the problem was due to instances of 
contaminated fuel, affecting a limited number of tanks, rather 
than a defectively designed tank.”  Coba, 2017 WL 3332264, 
at *8. 
Although Coba posits that the District Court only 
reached this conclusion by “construing all facts and drawing 
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all inferences . . . in favor of [Ford],” Appellant’s Br. 56, the 
evidence to which he points fails to raise a triable issue.  Coba 
relies primarily on a 2005 email from a Ford engineer 
remarking that recent tests of tanks exhibiting delamination 
uncovered “no bio-diesel traces” and noting that they were 
looking at “different additives that could cause [the] 
delamination.”  App. 963.  But, viewing this evidence in the 
light most favorable to Coba, it shows that some Ford 
engineers had doubts whether biodiesel was the problem and 
they were continuing to investigate.  It does not support the 
inference, as Coba contends, that Ford knew the problem was 
a design defect and that biodiesel was a “pretext,” Appellant’s 
Reply Br. 20.  Cf. United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 
V.I.N. SRH-16266 By & Through Goodman, 43 F.3d 794, 809 
n.13 (3d Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between knowledge and 
“suspicion followed by a failure to make further inquiry”).  
Nor is that inference supported either by the correspondence 
to which Coba points concerning the mere prevalence of the 
delamination problem or by other correspondence that post-
dates his truck purchases and thus has no bearing on Ford’s 
earlier knowledge. 
Because there is no genuine dispute of material fact as 
to Ford’s knowledge of a design defect, its failure to disclose 
that alleged defect does not give rise to liability under the 
NJCFA. 
b. Materiality of Delamination Risk 
Coba fares no better with his alternative theory that 
Ford violated the NJCFA by failing to disclose material 
information about the risk of delamination.  To establish that 
information withheld was “material,” Coba would need to 
show that “a reasonable [person] would attach importance to 
its existence in determining his [or her] choice of action.”  
Suarez v. E. Int’l Coll., 50 A.3d 75, 89 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2012).  But the most favorable evidence in the record for 
Coba concerning the rate of delamination comes from Ford’s 
expert who analyzed Ford’s warranty database and found that 
Ford was replacing Magni-lined steel fuel tanks for model 
year 2003-2007 F-series trucks like Coba’s at a rate of less 
than 1% across the United States.  That replacement rate, 
moreover, included all tank replacements, not merely those 
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related to delamination, suggesting an even lower 
replacement rate for delaminated tanks.  And while Coba 
criticizes the warranty data as under-inclusive because it 
covered only tanks that Ford actually replaced while 
excluding those denied warranty coverage, he identifies no 
concrete evidence of a higher rate of delamination.10 
In any event, the relevant question is not the actual rate 
of delamination viewed in hindsight, but what Ford knew and 
therefore could have disclosed to customers about that rate.  
And the warranty data—reflecting delamination-based 
replacements at a rate of even less than 1%—was the 
information Ford had at the time.  As to that small percentage, 
based on the undisputed evidence that Ford then believed 
biodiesel to be the culprit and the recommendation in its 
owner’s manual against using those fuels, Ford had every 
reason to believe that risk was mitigated—as would any 
reasonable customer in possession of that same information.  
We therefore agree with the District Court that “[n]o 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that this information 
would be material to a reasonable consumer prospectively 
deciding, in March 2007, whether to purchase a Ford 6.0L 
diesel truck.”  Coba, 2017 WL 3332264, at *10.  
Accordingly, Coba’s second NJCFA theory, predicated on 
non-disclosure of the risk of delamination, also does not 
survive summary judgment. 
                                              
10 For example, Coba relies on a document stating that 
“[i]n April 2008, FCSD management indicated a higher than 
normal sales volume (500/month) for Diesel Fuel Tanks due 
to delamination concerns,” App. 1348, for the proposition that 
“Ford admit[ted] that at one point it was replacing over 500 
tanks per month due to delamination,” Appellant’s Br. 61.  
Inartfully phrased as the document may be, however, on 
closer inspection, it is apparent that it cannot plausibly bear 
the weight that Coba places on it.  To the contrary, it reflects 
that—whatever the extent to which delamination concerns 
may have contributed in part to the increased monthly sales 
volume—in the entire eight years between 2001 and 2008 





For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court.   
